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As a practicing lawyer I used to writhe in my seat so often at
hearing an eloquent opponent have the last word with the jury
that a chance to add a few more words is an appreciated privil-
ege. I will try to make them very brief indeed.
In the first place-and I may have been remiss in not empha-
sizing this at the outset-when you have issues in a case wholly
dependent upon state law, which under Erie R.R. v. Tompk1in
the federal courts must guess at, as a basic precept of federalism
we feel that a case where the state judges have the last word as
to what is the state law ought to be decided in the state court
unless there is some good reason to have it elsewhere.
It is true, invoking George Washington and James Madison,
that from the beginnings of this Republic federal diversity juris-
diction has been provided mostly on a concurrent basis; but when
one looks at all of the discussions as to why diversity jurisdic-
tion was originally provided, he does not find that that juris-
diction was provided from any thought of the desirability of
giving the local man, as opposed to the foreigner, a federal forum
because it was better or fairer, or for any other reason.
Mr. Frank's examples admittedly have a beguiling sound. The
last one, which he said was the most important moneywise, in-
volved an Arizona corporation as the plaintiff. Surely the
Arizona plaintiff can sue in the eastern federal court where the
records are, which is the convenient forum by his standards.
From the point of view of the eastern corporation that would
like to remove for the sake of transfer, there is an increasing and
growing development of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In the case of foreign origins, therefore, the state court may very
well allow a dismissal and force the suit to be brought in a con-
venient forum elsewhere. An eastern corporation sued in Ari-
zona could still remove and seek transfer unless these events
arose out of the activities of a local establishment as defined.
On his facts it appears as though this was unlikely to be true.
In the accretion case, he had Arizona plaintiffs, who on this
approach could not bring the case in federal court, and defend-
ants, some of whom were from Arizona and others from Cali-
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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fornia. Under our removal proposals any one of those California
defendants could remove.
As to the case of the Illinois corporation against the Arizona
resident, where some of the events in suit arose out of the local
activities and some did not, it is true that a situation may arise
where you will either have to proceed in the state court with all
cases together or you will have to separate them.
These situations, however, his first example, that of the Ari-
zona resident suing the national insurance company with a local
establishment in Arizona, is exactly the case which we think
doubly ought not to go into the federal court. It arises out of
state created rights, and I see no reason why the Arizona citizen
or the national insurance company should be able to take that
case into the federal court in Arizona instead of to the state
court.
Abraham Lincoln was also mentioned, and Mr. Frank has
written about Lincoln as a lawyer. I think, however, that Mr.
Lincoln was a good enough lawyer to do well anywhere, and
while I was glad to see Mr. Lincoln brought in to show that Mr.
Frank does not take the narrow Fourth Circuit approach and
confine himself to those days of 175 years ago, it does not seem
to me that the nature of Mr. Lincoln's practice, even added to
Washington and Madison, indicates precisely what ought to be
done today.
Finally, Mr. Frank initially admits in effect that I am right;
that we were not destroying diversity jurisdiction. However,
he thereafter uses such humorous words as gutting, slashing,
even junking in reference to diversity, and I repeat that under
our proposals that is just not so. You will still have the man
from outside the state of Virginia who gets involved in an auto-
mobile accident in Virginia, and he will still be able to remove
that case to the federal court if he so desires. It is only the local
Virginian who cannot say that he would rather have the federal
court, and I stand on my position that he should not.
With what we have left in federal jurisdiction, it makes little
difference exactly where the proportions are; but the notion that
our proposals will create a specialized bar is unfounded. No one
is happier about the Federal Rules than I. In fact, I drafted rules
based upon the federal rules for the state of Maine; but I submit
that it is patently incorrect to say that the merit or demerit of
these proposals will somehow mean the flourishing or the failure
of reforms of procedure in state courts based upon the federal
rules.
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